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FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECONDARY STRIKES
AND BOYCOTTS - A NEW CHAPTER
Robert F. Koretz*
Four recent decisions1 of the Supreme Court of the United States may
be deemed to conclude the first chapter in the story of the Federal govern-
ment's attempt in the Taft-Hartley Act 2 to outlaw the so-called "se-
condary boycott" in labor disputes. Seldom, if ever, has any term in
American law proved more elusive of precise definition or suggestive of
greater conflict of judicial and legislative opinion than the term "second-
ary boycott." The Taft-Hartley Act reflects a legislative opinion that
concerted labor activity usually characterized by this term merits blanket
condemnation. Congress wisely avoided use of the term in drafting the
relevant provisions. But the breadth and complexity of the statutory
definition is such that it promised to be as elusive of interpretation
and as controversial in effect as earlier attempts to give legal contour
to the "secondary boycott." The interpretative efforts of the National
Labor Relations Board, the agency largely responsible for initial con-
struction of the Taft-Hartley provisions, have been scrutinized by the
Supreme Court for the first time. It is the purpose of this article to set
forth the extent to which the NLRB's interpretation has received the
imprimatur of the high Court, and to suggest a few problems left in doubt.
Before doing so, however, a brief reference to pre-Taft-Hartley trends
in the law of the "secondary boycott" may prove helpful to an understand-
ing of the problems which have confronted the NLRB and the courts.
I. PRE-TAFT-HARTLEY TRENDS3
Although the term "secondary boycott" has never been given an
universally accepted definition, it generally connotes "a combination to
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 256, for biographical data.
1 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 71 Sup. Ct. 943 (1951); Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, A. F. of L. v. NLRB, 71 Sup. Ct.
954 (1951); NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 961 (1951); Local 74,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A.F. of L. v. NLRB, 71
Sup. Ct. 966 (1951).
These cases frequently are referred to by the abbreviated titles, respectively, of Denver,
Langer, Rice Milling, and fatson.
2 This is the popular name of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. 61 STAT. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
3 The "secondary boycott" in labor disputes has been the subject of extensive com-
mentary. The following, among others, may be consulted for detailed analysis of the topic:
GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 120-57 (rev. ed. 1949); LAmLER, Boycotts AND =
LABOR STRUGGLE (1913); MMLIS AND MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 581-99 (1945);
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influence A by exerting some sort of economic and social pressure against
persons who deal with A."4 As a matter of common law, a majority of
courts unhesitatingly have held illegal most of such pressures by combina-
tions of laborers, frequently with little analysis of the diverse factual and
economic relationships involved.' This approach was highlighted when
in substance it was adopted by the Supreme Court in applying the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law to concerted labor activity.6 But other courts
-particularly those of New York-"found this comprehensive con-
demnation far too simple and... made discriminations."7
Perhaps the best, and certainly among the the most celebrated, illustra-
tions of the central issues are the opinions of the Supreme Court in
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering and Bedford Cut Stone Co. iv.
Journeyman Stone Cutters' Association.' The majority opinions reflect
the traditional condemnation of the "secondary boycott," but the classic
dissents of Mr. Justice Brandeis were milestones in the unfolding law
of labor relations. With characteristic insight into "the facts of industrial
life,"'1 he summarized and articulated the true nature of the conflicting
interests involved and provided the pattern for much of the judicial
and legislative thought concerning the "secondary boycott" in the present
generation. Reduced to its essential facts, Duplex involved a refusal
by the Machinists' Union to furnish union labor to New York customers
of the Duplex Co. for installation and operation of presses manufactured
by Duplex in Michigan. The union's conduct stemmed from the refusal of
Duplex to recognize the union or its standards, and the threat of" other
Wommxr, Tim Boycot r AmiucA= TRADE UNioNs (1916); Bernard and Graham,
Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WAsHr. L. Rtv. 137 (1940); Dennis, The Boycott
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 3 N.Y.U. CoNF. ON LABOR 367 (1950); Dennis, The Boycott
in Labor Disputes Under State and Federal Law, 2 N.Y.U. CoxF. ON LABOR 417 (1949);
Dennis, The Secondary Boycott, 1 N.Y.U. Co-r. ON LABOR 359 (1948); Feinberg,
Analysis of the New York Law of Secondary Boycotts, 6 BRoo]KL , LAw Rav. 209 (1936);
Gromfine, Labor's Use of Secondary Boycotts, 16 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 327 (1947);
Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341 (1938); Smith,
Coercion of Third Parties in Labor Disputes-The Secondary Boycott, 1 LA. L. REV,
277 (1939).
4 FRa. xruRaER AND GREE, Tan LABOR IwN xOnoN 43 (1930).
5 The authorities are amply collected and discussed in the books and articles cited in
note 3 supra. For a concise and careful analysis, Gromfine, supra note 3, is particularly
recommended.
6 E.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S. 443 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Assn., 274
U. S. 37 (1927).
7 Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 44.
8 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
9 274 U. S. 37 (1927).
10 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 481 (1921).
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manufacturers of presses to withdraw their recognition of the union
unless Duplex also entered into an agreement. For a majority of the
Court, it sufficed to establish a violation of the Sherman Law, even as
limited by Section 20 of the Clayton Act,'1 that the defendants had en-
gaged in a "secondary boycott" which interfered with Duplex's interstate
trade. But for Mr. Justice Brandeis the question was: "May not all
with a common interest join in refusing to expend their labor upon
articles whose very production constitutes an attack upon their standards
of living and the institution which they are convinced supports it?"'2
An affirmative answer followed from a penetrating analysis of the facts
of the case and "matters of common knowledge,"'" which established
the requisite community of interest. In reaching this conclusion, however,
Mr. Justice Brandeis was careful to distinguish between boycotts which
"are illegal because they are conducted not against a product but against
those who deal in it and are carried out by a combination of persons not
united by common interest but only by sympathy" and those in which,
as here, "all members of a union by whomever employed . . . refuse to
handle materials whose production weakens the union."' 4 The Bedford
Cut Stone case, aptly termed the "capstone' of the development in appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to labor,' provided an even more pointed
vehicle for a statement of Mr. Justice Brandeis' position. In this case,
as he made clear in his dissent, the refusal of union members to handle
Bedford stone was purely defensive, following the companies' refusal to
continue a long course of dealing with the union, a lockout of union
members, and the establishment of what plainly appears to have been a
company-dominated union. And the refusal to handle the product was
not accompanied, as it was in Duplex, by aggressive acts such as threats
of violence and the conscription of other crafts. But a majority of the
Court thought that such differences did not distinguish the controlling
principle of Duplex, upon the authority of which the Court held that the
employing companies were entitled to an injunction.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act' clearly reflected legislative acceptance of
11 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. 52 (1946).
12 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 481 (1921).
13 Id. at 482.
'4 Id. at 483. This in substance was the line drawn by the New York Court of Appeals.
Compare Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917) with Auburn Draying Co.
v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919). For discussion of later New York developments,
see, among others, Feinberg, supra note 3, and Note, Present Status of Unity of Interest
Rule in New York, 1 SYRAcusn L. Rav. 291 (1949).
15 BE,&cm, LABoR mw THE Sxa An AcT 179 (1930).
16 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1946).
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the position urged by Mr. Justice Brandeis. The broad definition of
"labor dispute" contained in Section 13 of that statute leaves no doubt
that the Congress overruled Dudplex' and intended to substitute the line
suggested in the dissenting opinion.'8
To those who may argue that the sweeping proscription of "secondary
boycotts" in Taft-Hartley marks a retrogression to the era of the Duplex
and Bedford Cut Stone cases,"° certain factors should, in fairness, be
pointed out. Again referring to the dissent in Duplex, it will be recalled
that Mr. Justice Brandeis, in urging "the right of industrial combatants
to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of self-interest,"
did not attach "any constitutional or moral sanction to that right" and
made plain that it was within the province of the legislature to limit
"individual and group rights of aggression and defense" and "substitute
processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat."'
In 1932, the Congress accepted his argument that combinations of la-
borers should be allowed equality of "aggression and defense" in indus-
trial disputes, and enacted in Norris-LaGuardia a policy of laissez-faire
in such matters. In only three years, however, this policy of almost
complete non-intervention was forsaken when the Wagner Act' gave
governmental encouragement and protection to the rights of self-organi-
zation and collective bargaining. Although the Congress did not purport
thereby to "limit" employee rights of "aggression and defense" in this
area of industrial strife,22 it did provide certain alternative "processes of
justice." To this extent, it weakened the rationale underlying the treat-
ment of secondary pressures in Norris-LaGuardia. To illustrate, if em-
ployer conduct like that in the Bedford Cut Stone case arose after pas-
sage of the Wagner Act, it seems clear that the sanctions of that Act
would afford the union a considerable measure of protection against the
employers' aggression. While it may be conceded that the Wagner Act
did not obviate the need for self-help in disputes involving organization
or collective bargaining, it plainly diminished its necessity and utility.
-7 U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231, 234 (1940).
's Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 215-17; Ratner and Come, The
Norris-LaGuardia Act in the Constitution, 11 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 428 (1943).
1. See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Pepper in the Congressional debates which preceded
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. 93 CoNo. REc. 4197-99 (1947). See also SEN. REP. No.
105, Part 2 (Minority Views), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21 (1947); -H.R. REP. No. 245,
Part 2 (Minority Report), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-8 (1947).
20 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921).
21 This is the popular name of the original National Labor Relations Act. 49 STAT. 449
(1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946).
22 See §§ 7 and 13 of the NLRA. 49 STAT. 452, 457 (1935) ; 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1946).
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But more than this, in some circumstances the limitations of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, in juxtaposition with the sanctions of the Wagner Act,
created indefensible situations. For example, where union A was cur-
rently certified by the NLRB as the exclusive representative of employees,
it seemed intolerable to permit union B to strike, picket or boycott the
employer or those with whom he did business to compel him to bargain
with it. Yet Norris-LaGuardia has been construed as denying jurisdiction
to the federal courts to enjoin such conduct.'
By 1947, there was substantial agreement that some of labor's second-
ary pressures were unjustified. But there was sharp disagreement be-
tween those who believed that the inequities which had arisen warranted
blanket condemnation of "secondary boycotts" and those who thought
that an attempt should be made to draw the line at certain "unjustifiable"
boycotts. 4 The proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act supported the for-
mer view, and the statute to a large extent reflects acceptance of their
position.2" In Senator Taft's oft-quoted words:
23 Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1945); American Chain
and Cable Co., Inc. v. Truck Drivers and Helpers Union, Local 676, A.F.L., 68 F. Supp. 54
(D. N.J. 1946). See Koretz, Minority Pressure Vis-a-Vis Majority Rule in Collective Bar-
gaining, 2 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 294, 296-99 (1951).
24 In his message on the State of the Union in January 1947, President Truman re-
quested legislation "to prevent certain -unjustifiable practices" and referred specifically to
"the secondary boycott, when used to further jurisdictional disputes or to compel employers
to violate the National Labor Relations Act." He amplified: "Not all secondary boycotts
are unjustified. We must judge them on the basis of their objectives. For example, boy-
cotts intended to protect wage rates should be distinguished from those in furtherance of
jurisdictional disputes. The structure of industry sometimes requires unions as a matter
of self-preservation to extend the conflict beyond a particular employer. There should be
no blanket prohibition against boycotts. The appropriate goal is legislation which prohibits
secondary boycotts in pursuance of unjustifiable objectives, but does not impair the union's
right to preserve its own existence and the gains made in genuine collective bargaining."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1947, p. 16, col. 3. Opponents of the Taft-Hartley Act agreed with
this view. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 105, Part 2 (Minority Views), 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
19-21 (1947); H. R. REP. No. 245, Part 2 (Minority Report), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66
(1947). Their unsuccessful effort to enact this approach into legislation appears in Section
106 of the "Administration" or Thomas-Lesinski Bill introduced in the 81st Congress.
S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 2032, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
25 Although the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrates the intent of
Congress to outlaw the "secondary boycott" generally, it is also clear that the relevant statu-
tory provisions, set forth below, do not proscribe all forms of conduct which have been
regarded as falling within this description. In particular, it should be noted that the
language of these provisions bans only pressures applied against the neutral or secondary
employer through his employees, and does not outlaw direct appeals to secondary employers
or to consumers. E.g, Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F. 2d 158, 165 (9th Cir. 1950) ;
Consolidated Frame Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1950). It also should be noted that Section
8(b) (4) (B) impliedly creates an exception to Section 8(b) (4) (A) so as to legalize conduct
otherwise outlawed by permitting a certified union to bring pressure against a secondary
1952]
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* . .under the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impos-
sible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind of a strike, no matter
how unlawful it may have been at common law. All this provision of the
bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts. It has
been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary
boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded
in having anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of secondary
boycotts. So we have broadened the provision dealing with secondary
boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice.26
II. THE TAFT-HARTLEY PROVISIONS
The basic Taft-Hartley proscription of the "secondary boycott" is
found in Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B), which makes it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents
(4) to engage In, or to induce or encourage the employees of any em-
ployer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . ..any
employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B)
forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a
labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of section 9. . .
It is safe to say that no provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law have raised
more difficult or complicated problems than these. A large number of
cases have been decided by the NLRB and by the courts, both in inter-
locutory injunction proceedings and upon review of Board orders, and
have been the subject of extended comment.18 No attempt will be made
to review these decisions except insofar as they bear upon the issues
presented to and resolved by the Supreme Court in the four cases under
discussion.
employer to compel the primary employer to honor his statutory duty to recognize and
bargain with the union. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Di Giorgio 'Fruit
Corp.), 87 N.L.R.B. 720, 748-49 (1949).
28 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947).
27 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) and (B) (Supp. 1950). Section
303 (a) (1) and (2), in language substantially identical, provides for damage suits in the
federal courts by persons injured by the conduct specified. 61 STAT. 158-59 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 187(a) (1) and (2) (Supp. 1950).
28 See, inter alla, Dennis, supra note 3; Johns, Picketing and Secondary Boycotts Under
the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 LABoR LAW J. 257 (1951).
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(1) Facts of tke Boycott Cases
The essential facts of the boycott cases are as follows:
Denver:-" A, the general contractor for the construction of a com-
mercial building, awarded a subcontract for electrical work to B, who
employed the only nonunion workmen on the project. The employees
of all other subcontractors and of A were members of unions affiliated
with the local building trades council, which, because of the presence of
B and his employees, determined to picket the job. In accordance with
the council's practice, each affiliate was notified of that decision, such
notice being a signal in the nature of an order to union members to leave
the job. Representatives of the council and certain of its affiliates notified
A that union men could not work with nonunion and that if B's employees
worked on the job, the council would put a picket on it to notify members
that the job was unfair. The council did so, whereupon the only em-
ployees who reported for work were those of B. Before B completed his
subcontract, A notified him to get off the job so that A could continue
the project. The council then removed its picket; union employees
resumed work; B's workmen were denied entrance to the job.
Upon the above facts, the NLRB found that the council and certain
of its affiliates, by picketing A's project and thereby causing union mem-
bers to quit work, with an object of forcing A to cease doing business
with B, violated Section 8(b) (4) (A).30 The reviewing court of appeals,
however, set aside the Board's order on the ground that the union's action'
was "primary and not secondary."-31
Langer:3 2 A, the contractor for the construction of a private dwelling,
subcontracted the electrical work to B and the carpentry work to C. B
was involved in a dispute with the Electricians Union and employed non-
union men. C employed members of the Carpenters Union. While work
was in progress, a representative of the Electricians Union informed C
and his employees that the electrical work was being done by nonunion
men and proceeded to picket the premises with an "unfair to organized
labor" placard. C and his men stopped work and informed A that they
had done so because of the picket. The Electricians' representative noti-
fied A that if he did not replace B he would not receive any skilled
tradesmen to finish the work. A told the circumstances to B, who re-
29 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 71 Sup. Ct. 943 (1951).
a0 Denver Building and Construction Trades Council (Gould and Preisner), 82 N.LR.B.
1195 (1949).
81 Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F. 2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
32 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, A. F, of L. v. NLRB,
71 Sup. Ct. 954 (1951).
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leased A from the subcontract. A made arrangements with a union elec-
trical subcontractor to complete the electrical work. When C was so
notified, his carpenters returned to work.
The NLRB found that the Electricians Union and its representative,
by picketing the job, induced the employees of C to engage in a strike,
with an object of forcing A to cease doing business with B, and thereby
violated Section 8(b) (4) (A)."3 This finding was approved by the
reviewing court of appeals. 4
Rice Milling:85 The union, in the course of an organizational campaign
among the employees of six rice mills, picketed the mills, including A's
mill, to obtain recognition as collective bargaining representative. One
afternoon two employees of B, a customer of A, came in a truck to A's
mill to obtain rice or bran for B, a neutral in the labor dispute. The
pickets formed a line across the road and, when the truck stopped, told
its occupants there was a strike on and the truck would have to go back.
The drivers agreed, returned to the highway- and stopped. One got out
and went to a mill across the street. At that time a vice-president of A
came out and asked whether the truck was on its way to the mill and
whether its occupants wanted to get the order they came for. The man
on the truck explained that he was not the driver and that the vice-
president would have to see the latter. On the driver's return, the truck
proceeded, with the vice-president, to the mill by a short detour. The
pickets ran toward the truck and threw stones at it. The truck never-
theless entered the mill.
The NLRB held that the union's conduct toward B's employees did
not violate Section 8(b) (4) (A) or (B) 6 on the ground that:
The [union's] activities arose out of the primary picketing of . . . [A's]
mill, and were carried out in the immediate vicinity of that mill. Violence
on the picket line is not to be condoned, but violence does not convert
primary picketing into secondary action within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(A) or (B). 37
The reviewing court of appeals disagreed with the Board's conclusion, 8
holding in substance that the Union's conduct came within "the plain
33 International Brotherhood Electrical Workers (Patterson and Langer), 82 N.L.R.B.
1028 (1949).
34 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, v. NLRB, 181 F. 2d 34
(2d Cir. 1950).
35 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 961 (1951).
36 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Intl Rice Milling Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 360
(1951).
37 Id. at 361-62.
38 International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F. 2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950).
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wording of the statute," which did not admit of "any distinction between
primary and secondary activities" 9 or based upon the situs of the
activity.
Watson:4 Early in 1947, the union requested A, operator of a store
having a department for the sale and installation of wall and floor cover-
ings, to execute a closed-shop contract with the union as the bargaining
agent of A's installation employees. Following A's refusal, the union
placed a picket in front of the store. About August 7, B, owner of a
dwelling, contracted with C, a member of the union, to renovate the
house. C hired the necessary workmen, including members of the union,
and proceeded with the work. It became necessary to procure floor and
wall coverings for certain rooms. Neither B nor C could find any satis-
factory to B except at A's store, and A insisted that its own nonunion
employees install any coverings it sold. B nevertheless contracted with
A for the purchase and installation of the coverings. The work of instal-
lation done by A's nonunion men proceeded for a time, but when the
situation came to the attention of the union, its business agent on
August 21 told the four union carpenters employed on the project that
they could not continue to work where nonunion men were employed.
In compliance with these instructions, which were never rescinded, the
carpenters did not return to work on the next day, August 22, the date
on which the Taft-Hartley provisions became effective,41 nor on several
succeeding days. A's employees completed their work by August 28,
and the unfinished carpentry work was completed by two of the union
men, who returned without the knowledge or consent of the union.
The NLRB found that the union and its representative, by continuing
after the effective date of Taft-Hartley to induce employees to engage
in a strike at B's residence, with an object of forcing B to cease doing
business with A, violated Section 8(b) (4) (A).' This finding was ap-
proved by the reviewing court of appeals.
(2) Issues Involving the Boycotts
The Supreme Court upheld the orders of the NLRB in each of the
four cases. In so doing, it resolved or partially resolved a number of
39 id. at 26.
40 Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and joiners of America, A. F. of L. v.
NLRB, 71 Sup. Ct. 966 (1951).
41 § 104, 61 STAT. 152 (1947).
42 Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and joiners (Watson's Specialty Store)
80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948).
43 NLRB v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F.
of L., 181 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950).
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issues of great importance to the administration of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Aside from several jurisdictional or procedural problems presented to
the Court,44 the central issues relating to the allegedly unlawful boycotts
were:
(a) Whether Section 8(b)(4) (A) and (B) permits a distinction
between primary and secondary labor action and, if so, to what extent.
(b) Whether picketing to induce secondary pressure is protected by
Section 8(c) 45 as an expression or "views, argument, or opinion" or by
the First Amendment as an exercise of the right of free speech.
(a) The Primary-Secondary Dichotomy
Probably the most important problem before the Court was whether
Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) contemplates a distinction between "pri-
mary" and "secondary" action. The decisions of the circuit courts in
the Rice Milling, Langer and Denver cases indicate the divergence of
possible views on the matter. In the first, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was of the opinion that the language of the statute pre-
cluded such a distinction; in the second, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, while leaving open the question, approved the NLRB's
finding of illegal "secondary" action; in the third, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia decided that the statute not only permitted
the dichotomy, but that the NLRB had construed too narrowly the
allowable area of "primary" action.
The position of the NLRB: Undoubtedly the decisions of the Supreme
44 The discussion which follows is limited in the main to issues involving interpretation
of the boycott provisions of the statute. The other issues, largely jurisdictional or proce-
dural in nature, were raised by the contentions: (1) in Denver, Langer and Watson that
the activities in question did not affect interstate commerce sufficiently to enable the NLRB
to take jurisdiction; (2) in Denver that the decision of the federal district court, adopting
the preceding contention in the preliminary proceeding for interlocutory injunctive relief,
made the issue res judicata; (3) in Watson that the allegedly illegal conduct took place
before the effective date of the statute and hence could not have constituted a violation;
and (4) in Watson that the case was rendered moot by completion of the project. The
Court found no merit in these contentions. Probably of greatest practical significance in
connection with these contentions is the dictum of the .Court in which it plainly upheld
the NLRB's discretion to decline jurisdiction on the ground that it would not effectuate
the policies of the Act, even though the effect of the activities on interstate commerce is
sufficient to enable it to do so. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 71
Sup. Ct. 943, 949 (1951).
45 "The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
contains no -threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(c) (Supp. 1950).
[Vol. 37
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Court can best be understood against the background of the approach of
the NLRB to the problem of statutory construction.46
At the outset, the NLRB concedes that Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B),
if read literally and in isolation, appears to proscribe all strikes and
picketing, whether primary or secondary4T But such a construction
does violence to other provisions of the statute and frustrates Congres-
sional purpose. Thus, Section 748 explicitly protects the right to engage
in concerted activities and Section 1311 the right to strike. And several
other sections 0 of the Act likewise would be largely meaningless if
Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) were given literal construction5 1 Further,
the legislative history of the Act demonstrates that this section was
intended to outlaw union tactics familiar to Congress as "secondary
boycotts," and that Congress did not, in general, intend to ban the pri-
mary strike and concomitant pressures, such as primary picketing and
allied inducement, even though such pressures might induce third parties
to support the primary strike8 And violence attending the inducement
is immaterial to a determination of whether a violation of Section
8(b) (4) (A) and (B) has occurred; for this section is concerned with
the objectives of labor activity rather than the means by which it is
carried out 8 In sum, Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) "represents an effort
by Congress to achieve a satisfactory reconciliation of the interest of
employees and labor organizations in exerting effective economic pres-
sure upon employer participants in labor disputes, on the one hand, and
46 The following outline of the NLRB's position is based largely on the NLRB's excellent
briefs before the Court, and upon 14 NLRB AwN. REP. 87-98 (1949); 15 NLRB Aw. REP.
137-49 (1950).
47 Brief for NLRB, pp. 18-19, NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 71 S. Ct. 961
(1951), hereinafter referred to as "Rice Milling brief." "Every primary strike has 'an
object thereof' to cause the employer to 'cease doing business' with another person and
thereby to induce the employer to yield to a demand in order to avoid resulting economic
loss through the disruption of his business relations. So too, and with the same end in
view, all primary picketing and related inducement, by urging the workers of a neutral
employer not to enter the premises of the struck employer, has as 'an object thereof' to
'induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in . . . a concerted refusal
in the course of their employment to ...work.'" Id. at 19.
48 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1950).
49 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (Supp. 1950).
60 §§ 2(3), 206-10, 201-05, 8(b) (4)(C), 8(b) (1) (A), 61 STAT. 137-38, 155-56, 153-55,
141-42, 141, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 176-80, 171-75, 158(b) (4) (C), 158(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1950).
ra Rice Milling brief, pp. 21-23.
62 These arguments are extensively discussed and documented in the Rice Milling brief,
pp. 26-63.
5 Id. at 63-66.
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the interest of neutral employers in immunity from economic pressure,
on the other." '54
The foregoing compromise between conflicting interests has been the
basis of the NLRB's approach in drawing the line between permissible
primary pressures and proscribed secondary action In the usual case,
where the employer's place of business is stationary, and geographically
removed from the premises of any other employer, this determination
ordinarily is based upon whether the pressures are geographically con-
fined to the situs of the labor dispute. Thus if, as in the Rice Milling
case, picketing is restricted to the premises adjacent to the business of
the employer party to the dispute, or if third persons are otherwise in-
duced at this site not to' enter those premises,56 such pressures are primary
and lawful, notwithstanding that an obvious object of such conduct is to
dissuade all persons from entering.M7 But if these pressures extend to
the place of business of a neutral employer, they are secondary and
unlawful."8
Obviously more difficult is the problem of interpretation where there
is no geographic separation between the premises of the primary em-
64 Brief for NLRB, p. 21, NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 71 Sup.
Ct. 943 (1951), hereinafter referred to as "Denver brief."
65 Denver brief, p. 22. The following summary of the criteria adopted by the NLRB
in drawing the line between primary and secondary action is based largely upon the Denver
brief-, pp. 23-38; 14 NLRB ANne. REP. 87-98 (1949); 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 137-49 (1950).
6 In the light of the Court's decision in Rice Milling, discussed infra, it is worth noting
the NLRB's argument with respect to any attempt to differentiate between "incidental
inducement" attendant to primary picketing and "intentional inducement" illustrated by
the pickets' statements to the employees of B as they approached the picket line in B's
truck. The NLRB argued, inter alia: "Such a line creates more mischief than it avoids.
According to this formulation, the inducement which flows from the mere existence of a
picket line is permitted, but as soon as a picket tells the employee of a neutral that to
cross the picket line is to 'scab,' that is prohibited. Suppose, instead of such an oral
statement, the same statement is printed on a picket's placard for all the world to see.
Is the ensuing inducement of employees of other employers who approach the picket line
incidental or intended? Must the printed statement be qualified by the addition of the
words 'except employees of other employers'? Must the placard be removed when em-
ployees of other employers approach the picket line? What is the picket's obligation when
workers employed at the plant and employees of other employers approach simultaneously?
Such queries can be multiplied by the infinite variety of situations which picket line
activity presents...." Rice Milling brief, pp. 53-54.
57 See also Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union (Santa Ana Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B.
937 (1949); International Brotherhood of Teamsters (DiGiorgio Wine Co.), 87 N.L.R.B.
720 (1949).
s E.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Wadsworth Building
Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949), enforcement granted, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950); Print-
ing Specialties and Paper Converters Union (Sealright Pacific, Ltd.), 82 N.L.R.B. 271
(1949); Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen, and Helpers (Howland Dry Goods Co.),
85 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1949).
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ployer and those of the neutral employer. In such "common-situs cases"
additional criteria necessarily must be invoked:
... The Board has considered it particularly pertinent to inquire into
these questions: (1) whether the labor organization involved has publi-
cized the dispute as involving the primary employer exclusively, or has by
its publicity or directions indicated that it regards the dispute as extending
to neutral employers as well; (2) whether the labor organization has indi-
cated that its direct and immediate objective is to force neutral employers
to cease doing business with the primary employer, or is merely to curtail
the primary employer's business; (3) whether the labor organization has
attempted to induce employees of neutral employers to refuse to perform
services for their own employer, rather than merely to refuse to render
only such services as assist the primary employer; and (4) whether the
labor organization has restricted its picketing as closely as practicable
under the circumstances both in point of time and place to the immediate
situs of the primary dispute. . .
Thus, where the neutral employer is engaged in business operations on
the primary employer's premises, picketing confined to these premises
with signs advertising only the dispute with the primary employer is
legal, notwithstanding that it has the effect of enlisting the aid of the
neutral's employees. 0 This result has been reached even where the
picketing of the premises included a gate which had been cut through
the fence to provide ingress for the employees of the neutral, a contractor
constructing additional facilities for the primary employer.61 Similarly,
where the business operations of the primary employer are ambulatory
and take place temporarily at the premises of the neutral-as, for
example, in the trucking business-:-picketing of the primary employer at
these premises, if confined to the times when he is doing business with
the neutral and publicizing only the primary dispute, is legal.6 2 But
59 Denver brief, pp. 15-16, 26-27.
60 E.g., Oil Workers International Union (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949);
Deena Artware, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 732, 735 (1949).
61 United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (Ryan Construction Corp.),
85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949).
62 E.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.),
87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949); Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL, (Moore Dry Dock Co.) 92
N.L.R.B. No. 93 (Dec. 8, 1950). In the latter case, the NLRB announced in considerable
detail the criteria applicable to this type of case. It stated that "picketing of the premises
of a secondary employer is primary if it meets the following conditions: (a) The picketing
is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's
premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal
business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location
of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary
employer." On July 31, 1951, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, per judge Frank,
remanded to the Board a case which it had decided before formulating these criteria for
reconsideration in their light, NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F. 2d 65 (2d Cir.
1951).
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where the union pressures are not so limited in time 3 or in publication,"
they are illegal. Thus if, as in Watson, the union calls a strike among
employees of a neutral contractor because of its dispute with a sub-
contractor, or if, as in Langer and Denver, it engages in picketing directed
at a neutral contractor or subcontractor because of a dispute with another
subcontractor, such pressures are secondary and fall within the ban of
the statute.
The Supreme Court decisions: While upholding the orders of the
NLRB in each of the four boycott cases, the decisions leave some ques-
tion as to the extent, to which they accept the Board's rationale.
The heart of the Court's analysis of this aspect of the cases appears
in the Denver and Rice Milling decisions. The former seems to go far
toward sustaining the NLRB's approach. Certainly, it leaves no doubt
but that the Board is not required to read Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B)
in literal isolation. The Court recognizes that the legislative history of
these provisions reflects Congressional intent to ban "secondary boy-
cotts"; that "at the same time . . . §§ 7 and 13 safeguard collective
bargaining, concerted activities and strikes between the primary parties
to a labor dispute"; I and that Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) therefore
should be read in "conformity with the dual congressional objectives of
preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on
offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffend-
ing employers and others from pressures in controversies not their
own.")6 6 And, according to the Court, the NLRB's findings of statutory
violations in Watson, Denver and Langer not only follow the literal
language of the statute, but comport with the "dual congressional
objectives." It is of course true, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Douglas
in his dissenting opinion in Denver, that where the unions' conduct stims
from the employment of nonunion men on the same job, the "right to
strike" is made "dependent upon fortuitous business arrangements ... "
But it is difficult, as a matter of statutory interpretation, to quarrel with
the majority's conclusions (1) that, in the language of the statute, "an
object" of the unions was to force a contractor to cease doing business
63 International Brotherhood of Teamsters. etc. (Sterling Beverages, Inc.), 90 N.L.R.B.
401 (1950).
64 E.g., Local 1796, United Botherhood of Carpenters, etc. (Montgomery Fair Co.), 82
N.L.R.B. 211 (1949); Local 760, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Roane-
Anderson Co.), 82 N.L.R.B. 696 (1949).
65 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 71 Sup. Ct. 943, 951 (1951).
66 Id. at 953.
67 Ibid.
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with a subcontractor and (2) that no "adequate reason" can be found
for departing from the statutory language of "doing business" so far as
the relationship of contractor and subcontractor was concerned.6 9 It
becomes entirely clear, then, that the facts of common situs and single
job do not preclude the NLRB from finding illegal secondary pressure
where there is an independent contractor relationship between the em-
ployers involved. And there can be no doubt that the NLRB has been
sustained in its holdings that strike and concomitant pressures directed
against secondary contractors or subcontractors are illegal.
But the other side of the coin, as reflected by the Rice Milling decision,
is considerably less distinct. The Court, in sustaining the NLRB's dis-
missal of the charge in question, did not rest its decision simply on the
grounds upon which the Board had relied, viz., that the union's "activities
arose out of the primary picketing of . . . [A's] mill and were carried
out in the immediate vicinity of that mill."7" Rather, the Court reasoned
as follows:
A sufficient answer to this claimed violation of the section is that the
union's picketing and its encouragement of the men on the truck did not
amount to such an inducement or encouragement to 'concerted' activity
as the section proscribes. While each case must be considered in the light
of its surrounding circumstances, yet the applicable proscriptions of§ 8(b) (4) are expressly limited to the inducement or encouragement of
68 It was argued, and the court of appeals had held in the Denver case, that as the
unions' ultimate object was to unionize the entire project, "the object was not in any
literal sense to require . . . [the contractor] to cease doing business with . . . [the sub-
contractor]." NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 186 F. 2d 326, 335 (1950).
As the Supreme Court pointed out, however, the language and legislative history of the
section make it clear that the proscribed object need not be the sole object of the union's
pressure. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Cost. Trades Council, 71 Sup. Ct. 943, 952 (1951).
6 The rationale underlying the decision on this point has been most dearly articulated
in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Langer:
"The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has
no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the
hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employee's demands. We
cannot see why it should make any difference that the third person is engaged in a
common venture with the employer, or whether he is dealing with him independently.
The phrase 'doing business' would ordinarily cover any business which the third party
is free to discontinue, regardless of whether he is merely supplying materials to the
employer, or has subcontracted with him to perform part of a work which the third
party has himself contracted to do. The third party cooperates as truly with one to
whom he furnishes materials as with a subcontractor. Indeed, when the coercion is
-upon the third person to break a contract with the employer, his position is more
embarrassing than if he may discontinue his relations with the employer without
danger of liability. The phrase, 'cease doing business,' is general and admits of no
such evasion."
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34,
37 (2d Cir. 1950).
70 See p. 242, supra.
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concerted conduct by the employees of the neutral employer. That lan-
guage contemplates inducement or encouragement to some concert of action
greater than is evidenced by the pickets' request to a driver of a single
truck to discontinue a pending trip to a picketed mill. There was no
attempt by the union to induce any action by the employees of the neutral
customer which would be more widespread than that already described.
There were no inducements or encouragements applied elsewhere than on
the picket line. The limitation of the complaint to an incident in the geo-
graphically restricted area near the mill is significant, although not neces-
sarily conclusive. The picketing was directed at ... [A's] employees and
at their employer in a manner traditional in labor disputes. Clearly, that,
in itself, was not proscribed by § 8 (b) (4). Insofar as the union's efforts
were directed beyond that and toward employees of anyone other than...
[A] there is no suggestion that the union sought concerted conduct by
such other employees. Such efforts also fall short of the proscriptions In
§ 8(b) (4). In this case, therefore, we need not determine the specific
objects toward which a union's encouragement of concerted conduct must
be directed in order to amount to an unfair labor practice under subsection
(A) or (B) of § 8(b) (4). A union's inducements or encouragements
reaching individual employees of neutral employers only as they happen
to approach the picketed place of business generally are not aimed at
concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such employees.
Generally, therefore, such actions do not come within the proscription of
§ 8(b) (4), and they do not here.71
And the Court went on to approve the NLRB's conclusion that the vio-
lence on the picket line was not material, stating that: "The substitution
of violent coercion in place of peaceful persuasion would not in itself
bring the complained-of conduct into conflict with § 8(b) (4). It is the
object of union encouragement that is proscribed by that section, rather
than the means adopted to make it felt."
7 2
The Court's rationale with respect to the word "concerted" appears
to mark a somewhat surprising transition from rather liberal interpre-
tation to extreme literalness. While the Court seems justified in stating
that Section 8(b) (4) is "expressly limited to the inducement or encour-
agement of concerted conduct by the employees of the neutral em-
ployer,"7 can it realistically be said that the union's activity was not
such an inducement? Conceding that the inducement involved only the
"driver of a single truck,"7 would the result have been different had
71 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 961, 964 (1951).
72 Id. at 965.
73 Id. at 964. As previously indicated, however, the section read literally and in isolation
would seem to proscribe strike activity or inducement or encouragement of concerted
conduct of employees of the primary employer, regardless of any inducement directed
toward the employees of the neutral. See note 47 supra.
74 The evidence is plain that there were two employees of the neutral on the truck.
So far as appears, the NLRB has always considered as "concerted" any parallel activity
involving more than one employee. See, e.g., Denver Building and Construction Trades
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there been two or more trucks of the same employer, or of different
employers driven by members of the same labor organization? Would
not the refusal to permit this truck to pass induce other drivers, if any,
of the same employer not to pass? Would not the last question be
particularly pertinent if the truck were that of a neutral employer en-
gaged in the transportation industry who owned several trucks which
variously serviced the primary employer? Indeed, with reference to
certain facts in Rice Milling raising an issue not before the Court on the
certiorari granted-the inducement of employees of two neutral railroads
to refuse to transport articles to and from the mill 7 -the Court stated
that "the encouragement of concerted action which was alleged in that
charge differed substantially from the conduct which is before ' us.""
Aside from this, the only guide the Court suggests is that the section
"contemplates inducement or encouragement to some concert of action
greater than is evidenced by the pickets' request to a driver of a single
truck to discontinue a pending trip to a picketed mill. 7 7 Such an attempt
to distinguish between inducement of individual and of concerted activity
may prove quite as unrealistic and unworkable as would have been a
rejection of the primary-secondary dichotomy.
But perhaps more troublesome than the Court's holding are possible
implications arising from the rationale upon which it was based. Before
turning to this, however, it must be emphasized that the fact that the
Court chose to rest its decision on ultimate grounds different from those
urged by the NLRB does not mean that it rejected in toto the Board's
theory. On the contrary, there is much in the language of the opinions
that supports the Board's approach. As already stated, the Court appar-
ently accepted the Board's argument that the statute permits the
Council (Gould and Preisner) 82 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1197-98 (1949); Griffin Wheel Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 1471 (1948). Cf. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and joiners of America
(Wadsworth Building Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 818 (1949).
74 The inducement in this connection involved not only the extension of the picket line
across the railway tracks, but requests to the railroad employees' bargaining representative
that it have the employees respect the picket line and threats of violence to such employees
if.they did not. The NLRB dismissed charges relating to this conduct on the ground that
railroad employees were not "employees" of an "employer" within the meaning of § 8(b) (4).
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Int'l. Rice Milling Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 360 (1949).
The court of appeals held to the contrary. International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183
F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950). The Board did not seek a review of this portion of the case.
76 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 961, 963, n. 2 (1951).
77 Id. at 964. At no time did the NLRB urge that its action dismissing the complaint
be sustained on the theory adopted by the Court. In the Ryan case the Board stated in
somewhat similar circumstances that "It makes no difference whether 1 or 100 other em-
ployees wish to enter the premises." United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of
America (Ryan Construction Co.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417, 418 (1949).
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"primary-secondary" distinction. Each of the four opinions makes it
plain that striking and picketing at the premises of, and directed toward,
the primary employer and his employees is not banned by Section
8(b) (4) (A) and (B), even though per se it might have the incidental
effect of inducing or encouraging employees of neutrals concertedly to
refuse to perform their services."h It seems a fair implication from the
opinions that where the primary employer's business operations are am-
bulatory and take place temporarily at the neutral's premises, picketing
directed at the primary employer at this site likewise is permissible. 9
From the language of Rice Milling quoted above, it must be inferred
that the Court was troubled by what the NLRB aptly has termed "inten-
tional inducement," as distinguished from the "incidental inducement"
flowing from the usual primary picket line.80 For while the Court ex-
pressly stated that the picketing directed at A and his employees was
not banned by Section 8(b) (4), it upheld the validity of the union's
further efforts directed at B's employees-presumably, the express re-
quest that the truck go back followed by stone-throwing--only on the
ground that this was no inducement of "concerted" conduct. If the
Court meant to imply that such "intentional inducement," when aimed
at "concerted" rather than at individual conduct, is violative of Section
8(b) (4), it may well be pointed out, as the NLRB had argued, that such
a refinement is unrealistic,81 and ordinarily is of little practical signifi-
cance. For it is common knowledge that a picket line in and of itself is
in most cases quite as effective a form of inducement to employees of
neutrals as the direct approach-certainly among organized workmen.
Indeed, as set forth below, in holding that peaceful picketing per se for
an object declared illegal by statute is not protected as an exercise of
the right of free speech, the Court expressly recognized that such picket-
ing is the customary means of enlisting employee support.
In the final analysis, it is concluded that, as a practical matter, the
78 XLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 71 Sup. Ct. 943, 951 (1951);
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, A. F. of L. v. NLRB, 71
Sup. Ct. 954, 957 (1951); NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 961, 964
(1951); United Brotherhood of Carpenters and joiners of America, A. F. of L. v. NLRB,
71 Sup. Ct. 966, 969 (1951).
79 See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, A. F. of L. v.
NLRB, 71 Sup. Ct. 954, 957 (1951). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
construed the Rice Milling decision as permitting such picketing of the ambulatory employer.
And this court expressly approved as sound the criteria, set forth in note 62 supra, which
the NLRB has adopted for this type of case. NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen
and Helpers, Local 145, 191 F. 2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951).
8o Rice Milling brief, pp. 52 et seq.
81 See note 56 supra.
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NLRB's approach has been substantially approved, notwithstanding
some peripheral obfuscation stemming from the Court's theory concern-
ing "concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct." The holding
that the usual picket line, directed at the primary employer and his em-
ployees at the former's place of business, does not violate Section 8 (b) (4),
regardless of its subjective effect on the employees of neutrals, can reason-
ably be anticipated in a majority of situations to shield what in fact is
effective pressure against the neutral at this place. " Where the usual
primary picket line fails to accomplish this result, the Court's expansive
conception of "individual" conduct may be expected to embrace most
additional union efforts to isolate the primary employer at his place of
business from his suppliers and customers.5
(b) Picketing as Free Speech
The contentions that the conduct of the unions in Denver, Langer and
Watson was privileged as an exercise of freedom of speech seemed much
less difficult of disposition. These contentions were based upon two
grounds: (1) that the picketing and similar inducement constituted only
the expression of "views, arguments, or opinion," safeguarded by Section
8(c); and (2) that peaceful picketing was protected by the First
Amendment. Short shrift was given to these contentions in Denver and
Watson. In the latter case the conduct condemned by the NLRB was
that the union and its agents had engaged in, and directly ordered, a
strike for a proscribed object. Neither Section 8(c) nor the First Amend-
ment applies to such acts. In Denver the NLRB had found that the
82 See the article on the four boycott cases by legal counsel to the American Federation
of Labor. Woll, Glenn, and Thatcher, Secondary Boycott Provisions Clarified, 2 LABOR
LAW J. 677 (Sept. 1951).
83 The foregoing conclusions seem fully supported by DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB,
191 F. 2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 72 Sup. Ct. 110 (1951). In this case, during
picketing by the Teamsters Union of an employer with whom it had a dispute, several
trucks of four trucking concerns were halted, and the pickets sought to persuade the drivers
not to pass. Some of these drivers were members of the union, the constitution and by-
laws of which prohibited members from crossing its picket line. Such members were
threatened with disciplinary action if they crossed the line, and one was disciplined for
doing so. A majority of the court read the Rice Milling decision as authority for approving
the NLRB's conclusion that this conduct was permissible "primary activity." Id. at 649.
A concurring member of the court thought that Rice Milling permitted this conduct only
because it did not induce a "concerted" refusal to handle. Id. at 651-52. It may prove
more difficult, however, to construe the Supreme Court's reasoning as supporting the
NLRB's position in cases presenting somewhat unusual circumstances such as those in the
Ryan case (note 61 supra), i.e., where the usual primary picket line is extended to a gate
cut through the fence to provide ingress for employees of a neutral contractor working on
the primary employer's premises. In such circumstances it is arguable that the extended
picket line in itself is a form of "intentional inducement" of "concerted" activity.
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picket was "tantamount to directions and instructions""4 to union mem-
bers to engage in strike action. Such "signal" picketing came within
neither the statutory nor the constitutional ambit of protected speech.
In Langer, however, there was no finding that the picketing and related
activities were signals for strike activity in accordance with union by-
laws or other practices. Rather, the NLRB found that the union, by
peaceful picketing, induced or encouraged the employees of subcontractor
C to strike to force A, the contractor, to cease doing business with sub-
contractor B. Hence the Court was faced squarely with the question
whether peaceful picketing per se for an object declared illegal by Section
8(b)(4)(A) was protected by Section 8(c). The Court entirely sus-
tained the Board's rationale in approving its negative answer. Not only
the literal language of Section 8(b) (4), but its construction in the light
of related sections, demonstrates that picketing is a form of inducement
or encouragement which is outlawed. Moreover, as the Board had em-
phasized, to exempt peaceful picketing, the customary means of enlisting
employee support, would frustrate the basic purpose of Section
8(b) (4) (A). 85
Finally, in the light of recent decisions recognizing the constitutional
right of states to outlaw peaceful picketing in furtherance of similarly
unlawful objectives, 6 there could be little doubt but that Congress could
"do likewise""s without infringing constitutional rights.
III. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the four boycott decisions represent a significant contri-
bution to an understanding of some of the most vexed problems that
have arisen under the Taft-Hartley Act. It is true that important ques-
tions seem to have been left unsettled-especially those arising from the
Supreme Court's rationale in Rice Milling based upon the term "con-
certed." But the concrete results far outweigh the remaining uncer-
tainties. Certainly, though not unexpectedly, the decisions have put the
84 Denver Building and Construction Trades Council (Gould and Preisner), 82 X.L.R.B.
1195, 1213 (1949).
85 The Court quoted extensively from the leading NLRB decision on this point. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Wadsworth Building Co.) 81 N.L.R.B.
802 (1949), enforcement granted, NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 184 F.2d
60 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 1011 (1951).
88 Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950);
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490 (1949).
S8 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, A. F. of L. v. NLRB,
71 Sup. Ct. 954, 960 (1951).
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quietus on the principal constitutional and jurisdictional objections urged
against the Taft-Hartley provisions. Of far greater significance, how-
ever, is the substantial extent to which, as' previously indicated, they
approve the interpretative efforts of the NLRB. In particular, it is sub-
mitted that the Board's articulation and application of the primary-
secondary dichotomy have injected a considerable degree of realism and
intra-statutory consistency into very broadly and intricately phrased, and
highly controversial, provisions. This is not to assert that these pro-
visions, as thus interpreted, are the ultimate answer to the diverse eco-
nomic and legal problems suggested by the "secondary boycott."
Reasonable men undoubtedly will continue vigorously to question the
wisdom and efficacy of these sweeping provisions, and their interpretation
as well. But given the premise upon which they were enacted-that the
abuses of the "secondary boycott" called for blanket proscription-the
boycott decisions reflect a notable service by the NLRB in giving the
Taft-Hartley provisions reasonable meaning in terms of industrial life
as we know it.
